News & Views

US Doing What it Can to Counteract High Gasoline Prices

High gasoline prices continue to plague efforts to lower inflation worldwide. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting sanctions prohibiting purchases of Russian oil substantially exacerbate tightness in world crude oil and petroleum product markets. As discussed below, markets dynamics foretold worldwide crude oil demand outpacing supply months before Putin’s ill-conceived attack. The Russia-Ukraine war and resulting market changes, however, wreaked such havoc on world markets that the US exported approximately 1.1 million barrels per day (Mmbpd) of crude oil and petroleum products on average over the past four weeks versus importing 343,000 barrels per day over the same four-week period a year ago. This ~1.5 Mmbpd swing to exports from imports represents a $20 per barrel to $30 per barrel swing in crude oil prices.

As shown in the following chart from the US Energy Information Administration, domestic crude oil inventories commenced declining rapidly in Spring 2021 (red circle). The prior six-week period, which saw significant additions to inventories of crude oil, marked the typical period of seasonal refinery maintenance when facilities shutdown and throughputs decline precipitously.

The graph below of US crude oil production exhibits a dip in flows from wells concurrent with refinery shut-in season, but with a corresponding rebound in production from 10.4 million barrels of oil per day (Mmbopd) in late March 2021 to well over 11.0 Mmbopd by July 2021. Production growth persisted until Fall 2021 when Hurricane Ida hit the Gulf Coast the final week of August, resulting in flooding and shut-in crude oil production. Unfortunately, demand growth persisted and crude oil inventories failed to recover through Winter 2021-2022, as shown in the above graph. 

Refineries, in order to meet burgeoning worldwide demand for gasoline, diesel, and petroleum products, only completed an amended turnaround in Fall 2021, as highlighted by the yellow circle in the following chart, negatively impacted by Hurricane Ida. As previously noted, this short turnaround for refiners offered no relief for the ongoing draws on crude oil production and inventories. This situation led to the initial increase in crude oil prices from the pre-Hurricane Ida $67 per barrel level to the $85 per barrel level in late-2021. Economically motivated, domestic US crude oil producers increased production year-over-year in 4Q21 to over 11.6 Mmbopd from 10.9 Mmbopd in late 2020. As shown in the above graph, these producers continued to increase production, albeit more ratably and conservatively than in earlier $100+ per barrel price regimes, to a recent 12.0 Mmbopd. Notably, oil drillers and oilfield services companies remained constricted by the same supply chain logistics snafus and lack of workers that complicated operations for much of the rest of the US.

Politicians and the popular press made much of declining refining capacity in the US. However, the above chart shows that refining capacity, again in response to high petroleum product prices, ran between 15 million barrels per day (Mmbpd) and 16 Mmbpd of throughput the entirety of the past 15 months, significantly higher than it ran over the prior year. Primarily in response to expectations for declining petroleum product demand, significantly higher expectations for alternative fuels and electric vehicles, and increased maintenance expenses, refinery throughput declined 8.6%, or 1.6 Mmbopd, from a peak of 18.0 Mmbopd in August 2018 to a recent 16.4 Mmbopd.

Very robust growth in gasoline and diesel demand brought on by the re-opening from COVID-related shutdowns, as shown in the graph above, combined with already very low crude oil inventories and long-term declines in refinery capacity provided a solid set-up for escalating crude oil and petroleum product prices months before Russia invaded Ukraine. With OPEC recenty producing 2.6 Mmbopd below its production goal in April and diminished spare production capacity, we do not see any quick fixes on the horizon other than conservation for high crude oil, gasoline, and diesel prices. In response to this opinion Solyco Wealth remains overweight the Energy sector, holding TotalEnergy, Schlumberger, Pioneer Natural Resources, Marathon Petroleum, and Earthstone Energy in its model portfolios.

Solyco Wealth Model Portfolios Endured 2Q22 to Maintain Outperformance Since Inception

While the 2022 downdraft for risk assets accelerated in 2Q22, the four model portfolios managed by Solyco Wealth remained, after fees, ahead of their benchmarks and the S&P 500 for seven of eight observations year-to-date (YTD) and since inception (SI). Year-to-date only the Conservative Model Portfolio, after a 0.50% fee, lagged its benchmark, doing so by 32 basis points (bps), or 0.32%. Performance after fees for all four portfolios– Conservative, Moderate, Moderately Aggressive, and Aggressive – exceeded that of the S&P 500 YTD led by the Moderately Aggressive Model Portfolio outdistancing the index by 809 bps, or 8.09%.

Stock-picking remained the driver of outperformance for Solyco Wealth across all time frames. The equity weightings in the portfolios, before fees, averaged exceeding the performance of the S&P 500 for the 2Q22, YTD, and SI periods by 32 bps, 397 bps, and 586 bps, respectively. Average returns for the fixed income holdings of the portfolios, by comparison, lagged those of the Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index by 336 bps for 2Q22, 103 bps YTD, and 47 bps SI, before fees.

Over the course of 2Q22, Solyco Wealth made very few changes to the four portfolios, consistent with the attentive portfolio management approach employed since the inception of operations on September 9, 2021. Across the four portfolios we reduced exposure to the Information Technology and Health Care sectors late in 2Q22, primarily by exiting positions in Taiwan Semiconductor, Humana, and Cigna, across the portfolios. Concurrently, we increased Industrials and Energy exposures with the additions of agriculture and construction equipment manufacturer Deere & Co. and petroleum refiner Marathon Petroleum. Over the course of more than three quarters of managing the portfolios, Solyco Wealth averaged making fewer than two changes to portfolio holdings per quarter. Holding approximately 30 total positions in individual equity and fixed income exchange traded funds (ETF) in each portfolio, Solyco Wealth remains committed to maintaining relatively concentrated, research-driven portfolios.

Conservative Model Portfolio

Returning (11.08%) YTD and (9.49%) SI after fees, the Solyco Wealth Conservative Model Portfolio YTD lagged its benchmark by 32 bps but exceeded it by 140 bps SI. As compared to the S&P 500, Conservative posted outperformances of 888 bps YTD and 575 bps SI. Equities in the Conservative Model led the S&P 500 across all time periods while fixed income ETFs in Conservative lagged the Bloomberg US Aggregate Index performance only in 2Q22, outperforming YTD and SI, as shown in a table on the following page.

Indicative of how poor 2Q22 was for stocks and bonds, only two holdings of the Conservative Model Portfolio posted positive contributions for the quarter: American Tower (+3.1%) and TotalEnergy (+0.5%). Amazon, down over 36% in 2Q22, defined the worst performer in the Conservative Model Portfolio. For the YTD and SI time periods Energy holdings Schlumberger and TotalEnergy remained the largest positive contributors to the portfolio as they have largely since inception.

Solyco Wealth Conservative Model Portfolio Comparative Performance: 2Q22, TYD, and Since Inception
    2Q22 Year-to-Date Since SW Inception
Benchmarks S&P 500 -17.41% -19.96% -15.24%
Russell 3000 -17.96% -21.10% -17.66%
MSCI All-World ex-US -15.85% -19.32% -20.92%
Bloomberg US Agg Bond -4.63% -10.35% -10.85%
Conservate Model Portfolio Portfolio -8.56% -11.08% -9.49%
Benchmark -6.38% -10.76% -10.90%
   +/- Benchmark -2.18% -0.32% 1.40%
   +/- S&P 500 8.85% 8.88% 5.75%
   +/- Equities vs. S&P 500 2.00% 3.88% 5.40%
   +/- Fixed Income vs. Agg -2.24% 0.31% 1.34%

The above table reflects a 1% annual management fee, or 0.89% since exception and 0.50% year-to-date through 6/30/2022. Actual client investment performance likely will differ from respective model portfolio performance due to several factors including: 1) Timing of securities purchases and sales, 2) Dividend reinvestment choices, 3) Securities held outside the model portfolio, 4) Weighting differentials for certain securities relating to whole versus partial share accounting, 5) Timing and pricing of rebalancing actions, and other minor factors.
Conservative benchmark = total returns for 10.0% Russell 3000 Index, 65.0% Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index, and 10.0% MSCI World ex-US Index and 15.0% cash allocations.

Moderate Model Portfolio

Returning (12.68%) YTD and (8.99%) SI after fees, the Solyco Wealth Moderate Model Portfolio outperformed its benchmark by 106 bps YTD and by 457 bps SI. As compared to the S&P 500, Moderate posted 728 bps of outperformance YTD and 625 bps SI. Equities in the Moderate Model fell below the S&P 500 in 2Q22 but led the index by 382 bps YTD and 797 bps SI. Moderate’s fixed income position lagged performance for the Bloomberg US Aggregate Index across all time periods: 287 bps in 2Q22, 60 bps YTD, and 3 bps SI.

Five equities in the Moderate Model Portfolio remained positive for the YTD and SI periods: Lockheed-Martin, Pioneer Natural Resources, Schlumberger, Traveler’s, and Vertex Pharmaceuticals. Amazon offered the stiffest headwind for Moderate’s performance. None of the eight fixed income holdings in Moderate offered a positive contribution YTD or SI, a testimony to the disastrous environment for that asset class thus far in 2022.

Solyco Wealth Moderate Model Portfolio Comparative Performance: 2Q22, TYD, and Since Inception
    2Q22 Year-to-Date Since SW Inception
Benchmarks S&P 500 -17.41% -19.96% -15.24%
Russell 3000 -17.96% -21.10% -17.66%
MSCI All-World ex-US -15.85% -19.32% -20.92%
Bloomberg US Agg Bond -4.63% -10.35% -10.85%
Moderate Model Portfolio Portfolio -11.46% -12.68% -8.99%
Benchmark -9.68% -13.74% -13.56%
   +/- Benchmark -1.78% 1.06% 4.57%
   +/- S&P 500 5.94% 7.28% 6.25%
   +/- Equities vs. S&P 500 -0.03% 3.82% 7.97%
   +/- Fixed Income vs. Agg -2.87% -0.60% -0.03%

The above table reflects a 1% annual management fee, or 0.89% since exception and 0.50% year-to-date through 6/30/2022. Actual client investment performance likely will differ from respective model portfolio performance due to several factors including: 1) Timing of securities purchases and sales, 2) Dividend reinvestment choices, 3) Securities held outside the model portfolio, 4) Weighting differentials for certain securities relating to whole versus partial share accounting, 5) Timing and pricing of rebalancing actions, and other minor factors.
Moderate benchmark = total returns for 22.5% Russell 3000 Index, 45.0% Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index, and 22.5% MSCI World ex-US Index, and 10.0% cash allocations.

Moderately Aggressive Model Portfolio

Returning (11.84%) YTD and (7.15%) SI after fees, the Moderately Aggressive Model Portfolio after fees outperformed its benchmark by 388 bps YTD and by 810 bps SI. As compared to the S&P 500, Moderately Aggressive posted 812 bps of outperformance YTD and 809 bps SI. Across all three time periods – 2Q22, YTD, and SI – the performance of equities in the Moderately Aggressive Model exceeded that of the S&P 500, driving 907 bps of outperformance SI. While Moderately Aggressive’s fixed income position lagged performance for the Bloomberg US Aggregate Index by 381 bps in 2Q22, contributions from the asset class YTD and SI outdistanced the index by 20 bps and 154 bps, respectively.

Tech holdings Autodesk, Applied Materials, and Advanced Micro Devices, and Cable and Entertainment companies Comcast and Paramount, each declined by more than 33% SI for the Moderately Aggressive Model. However, oil and gas producer Pioneer Natural Resources and lithium and fertilizer concern Sociedad de Quimica y Minera each generated 60%+ contributions to the portfolio. None of the eight fixed income holdings in Moderately Aggressive, despite exceeding performance of the fixed income benchmark index for two of the three displayed time periods, offered a positive return for any of the 2Q22, YTD, or SI, periods.

Solyco Wealth Moderately Aggresive Model Portfolio Comparative Performance: 2Q22, TYD, and Since Inception
    2Q22 Year-to-Date Since SW Inception
Benchmarks S&P 500 -17.41% -19.96% -15.24%
Russell 3000 -17.96% -21.10% -17.66%
MSCI All-World ex-US -15.85% -19.32% -20.92%
Bloomberg US Agg Bond -4.63% -10.35% -10.85%
Moderately Aggresive Model Portfolio Portfolio -13.02% -11.84% -7.15%
Benchmark -12.14% -15.72% -15.24%
   +/- Benchmark -0.88% 3.88% 8.10%
   +/- S&P 500 4.38% 8.12% 8.09%
   +/- Equities vs. S&P 500 0.99% 6.40% 9.07%
   +/- Fixed Income vs. Agg -3.81% 0.20% 1.54%

The above table reflects a 1% annual management fee, or 0.89% since exception and 0.50% year-to-date through 6/30/2022. Actual client investment performance likely will differ from respective model portfolio performance due to several factors including: 1) Timing of securities purchases and sales, 2) Dividend reinvestment choices, 3) Securities held outside the model portfolio, 4) Weighting differentials for certain securities relating to whole versus partial share accounting, 5) Timing and pricing of rebalancing actions, and other minor factors.
Moderately Aggressive benchmark = total returns for 32.5% Russell 3000 Index, 25.0% Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index, and 32.5% MSCI World ex-US Index, and 10.0% cash allocations.

Aggressive Model Portfolio

The negative returns YTD (17.02%) and SI (13.58%), after fees, generated by the Solyco Wealth Aggressive Model Portfolio provide direct evidence of the abhorrent environment for investors in 1H22 as Aggressive still outperformed its benchmark by 168 bps YTD and 432 bps SI and the S&P 500 by 294 bps YTD and 166 bps SI. The 5% of Aggressive allocated to Fixed Income, equally divided between short-term high yield bonds and emerging market government debt, lagged the Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index by >400 bps YTD and SI. Performance for Aggressive’s equities, however, continued to outpace that of the S&P 500 by more than 1% in 2Q22, 6% YTD and 9% SI.

Although the 65.1% SI return for Earthstone Energy continued to pace the Aggressive Model Portfolio, that stock declined 28.5% in the final month of 2Q22. Oilfield services leader Schlumberger, a 30% positive contributor SI, similarly saw its shares give back 25.5% in June 2022. These moves lower substantially undermined Aggressive’s performance for all time periods. Sociedad de Quimica y Minera with a +64% contribution SI and Vertex Pharma at a +46.6% SI return, however, positively contributed to the portfolio, which needed it to make up for the horrendous performances of Shopify (77.3%), YETI (55.3%), Paramount (38.4%), and Comcast (33.9%), to start 2022.

Solyco Wealth Aggresive Model Portfolio Comparative Performance: 2Q22, TYD, and Since Inception
    2Q22 Year-to-Date Since SW Inception
Benchmarks S&P 500 -17.41% -19.96% -15.24%
Russell 3000 -17.96% -21.10% -17.66%
MSCI All-World ex-US -15.85% -19.32% -20.92%
Bloomberg US Agg Bond -4.63% -10.35% -10.85%
Aggresive Model Portfolio Portfolio -17.29% -17.02% -13.58%
Benchmark -15.44% -18.70% -17.90%
   +/- Benchmark -1.85% 1.68% 4.32%
   +/- S&P 500 0.12% 2.94% 1.66%
   +/- Equities vs. S&P 500 -1.66% 1.79% 1.42%
   +/- Fixed Income vs. Agg -4.52% -4.03% -4.18%

The above table reflects a 1% annual management fee, or 0.89% since exception and 0.50% year-to-date through 6/30/2022. Actual client investment performance likely will differ from respective model portfolio performance due to several factors including: 1) Timing of securities purchases and sales, 2) Dividend reinvestment choices, 3) Securities held outside the model portfolio, 4) Weighting differentials for certain securities relating to whole versus partial share accounting, 5) Timing and pricing of rebalancing actions, and other minor factors.
Aggressive benchmark = total returns for 45% Russell 3000 Index, 5.0% Bloomberg US Aggregate Bond Index, 45% MSCI World ex-US Index, and 5.0% cash allocations.

Not for the Faint of Heart: Trading Tomorrow

Tomorrow marks the rebalancing of the Russell Indices on which many domestic equity market participants base their sector weightings, stock selections, and overall portfolio exposures. Given not only the overall turmoil in equity markets to start 2022 but also the major drivers of this disruption, this rebalancing season probably will result in some highly peculiar trading activity to say the least.

This probable outsized volatility comes on the heels of rather hectic trading last week, 6/13- 6/17. Last week culminated with Friday’s “quadruple witching,” which describes a trading day when stock options, stock index options, single stock futures, and stock index futures all expire at the close of trading. The lead up to quadruple witching likely drove heightened volume last week as the 645+ million shares traded of the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust (SPY) represented a 61% increase over SPY’s cumulative trading for the prior week. Thus far this week trading lagged that of last week, but wait and see what happens tomorrow (Friday, 6/24).

Among the peculiarities we will experience this coming Friday:  Meta [aka Facebook (FB)], Netflix (NFLX), and PayPal (PYPL), making their way into the Russell 1000 Value Index. Substantially reduced weightings in the Russell 1000 Growth Index for these three companies offsets the move to the value index. While the combined market capitalization levels of these three stocks at ~$640 billion falls well below what it did to start 2022, this move along probably will generate a few ripples in trading tomorrow.

The Russell 1000 Value Index overall will see a relatively significant reweighting from Health Care to Communication Services, which includes FB and NFLX, as shown in the following table below. Logically, an increase for the Health Care sector in the growth index supplants a reduction in exposure to the Communication Services sector. The magnitude of investment capital dedicated to value strategies thus far in 2022 dwarfs that of growth, hence the index movement of the above-noted once high-flying growth names FB, NFLX, and PYPL (among others).

My advice to those not inclined to move quickly in and out of their stock positions or that have yet to generate well-defined and well-thought buy-and-sell lists. Don’t watch. If you choose to watch, give the likely inexplicable market moves at least a week to sort themselves out.  Thus far 2022 already offers among the weirdest trading years on record. Try not to make it any weirder by falling victim to the technicalities of index rebalancing that themselves are only adjusting to 2022’s weirdness.

Set Your Expectations: Dynamics of and Rebounds from Bear Markets

A bear market for the benchmark S&P 500 came out of hibernation Monday (6/13) as the index breached the 20% loss level from its previous high January 3, 2022. Bear market conditions did not hibernate as long as usual this go around as only 22 months passed since the March 23, 2020, end of the prior, COVID-induced bear market, which only lasted a little longer than a month. This marked the shortest span between two bear markets since at least the Great Depression, as shown in the following table from S&P.

On average bear markets last a little more than 18 months. The most recent edition of bear market-dom defines the 15th iteration since 1929 of the unwelcomed phenomenon. This translates to the S&P 500 spending a little less than 25% of the time since the start of the Great Depression under bear market conditions, including more often than not from 3Q29 through 2Q49.

Looking for a little less dark-and-gloomy: the 12 post-1957 bear markets lasted on average a little over 12 months. The average negative return for these bear markets was 33%. Overall since 1957 the S&P 500 spent about 20% of the time trading through bear territory.

The following table, also from S&P, proves even sunshinier. It offers data on the timing and magnitude of recoveries from bear market conditions since 1957. This table excludes the 1990 bear market as that one only touched the 20%-decline condition. For the resulting 11 bear market recovery observations, the S&P 500 averaged 1% a week later, 3% after a month, 4% 6 months later, 15% after a year, and 30% 3 years later.

Only the Tech Wreck of 2001 remained negative 3 years after the onset of bear market conditions, albeit via a relatively very shallow, single-digit-loss ongoing drawdown. Probably more important for sanity at this point in the cycle, however, is the fact that for 77% of the time periods in the table above, or 49 of its 66 observations, the S&P 500 closed above its bear market level. The whipsaw of 2008, though, which saw mild positivity for a month after the arrival of the bear only to lose more than 25% over the next 6 months, offers a painful dose of potential reality. If solutions fail to eliminate the root driver of the negative condition causing the bear market, investors will continue to sell equities.

Inflation, Ugh.

Too much money chasing too few goods and services: inflation. Inflation is not a difficult concept to describe or to understand. Little Jill has an extra stick of gum that Jack would like to buy for a nickel. All looks good for Jack to enjoy a stick of gum until Billy, who also would like a stick of gum, arrives with a nickel and a penny he found on his walk over. Jill, ever the rational seller, agrees to sell Billy her last stick of gum for $0.06. Voilà, the Jill-Jack-Billy market for gum just experienced 20% price inflation.

The gum market balanced with just Jill and Jack involved, but Billy’s $0.06 – more money – unbalanced the market. If Jill’s mom happened to show up with another stick of gum – more supply – the market balances, providing both Jack and Billy still want a piece of gum. This balancing function that Jill’s mom provides in our very, very simple example represents what the US economy now sorely lacks, a balancing function.

This morning’s 8.6% annual increase in the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) surprised – again – to the upside as compared to the consensus expectation for an 8.3% increase in year-over-year prices. The above figure from The New York Times offers a breakdown by major product and service category of the drivers of this 8.6% indexed figure. Unless you pulled a Rip Van Winkle and fell asleep for the past year, I’m sure you’re quite aware that gas prices at the pump, soft drink prices at the grocery, and clothing prices at the mall, all are higher along with the prices for just about everything else.

For any number of reasons, ranging from:

  • COVID shutdowns that limited production and transportation of goods and services,
  • Ukraine – Russia war that disrupted trade flows,
  • Insufficient workers to increase production of stuff and to serve consumers, and
  • Ineffectual government policies that further these economic imbalances,

the world cannot supply sufficient goods and services to satisfy demand given the magnitude of money available to purchase goods and services. This imbalance places outsized pressure on the US Federal Reserve, unfortunately, to reduce the amount of money available to purchase goods and services. Alternatively, consumers could choose to scale back their consumption of stuff. They could opt to save some of this excess money they currently chose to spend. Alas, it’s the job of government to do for the people what they cannot do for themselves and reduce consumption by decreasing the amount of money available to buy stuff. Enter all of the discussions about the Fed increasing interest rates and engaging in quantitative tightening, or reducing the amount of money flowing through the economy.

This is where it gets complicated, though. Everyone freaks out about the Fed raising rates too much and pulling too much money out of the economy. Exacerbating these fears concerning the Fed’s actions, the potential for consumers to come to their senses and start saving some of their money and not buying so much stuff. Doubling down on these problems:  provider of goods and services solve their issues and oversupply the market and have to fire some workers. What was a robust economy growing at an attractive rate with historically low unemployment goes off the rails and into a ditch. Ugh.

All of a sudden one begins to see why even the greatest economics PhDs screw this up. Solving inflation requires balancing an equation but with far, far too many variables of unknown interdependencies. In order to help these struggling, anxiety-riddled PhDs balance this inflation equation, a rational consumer – the main character of every economics textbook – might choose to walk more, drive less, go on a diet, turn off the A/C, open a window, and save some dough. Or not…

Dollar-Cost Averaging: Benefit from Volatility

Dollar-cost averaging provides investors a tool with which they may use volatility to their advantage. Properly employed, the process offers benefits for buyers and sellers of traded assets ranging from stocks to bonds, cryptocurrencies, sports bets, and collectibles. Trading costs, both in terms of effort and commissions, mark drawbacks to the method.

In purchasing or selling assets at various points in time and at various prices – the procedure described by dollar-cost averaging – market participants with longer term perspectives may manage short-term market dynamics. Consider the following example:

  • An individual investor wishes to purchase 1,000 shares of stock in a biotech company, we’ll call it Hypothetical Biovations (HYPO for short),
  • Hypo will announce its quarterly earnings before the market opens in three days, and
  • Management may (or may not) provide positive (or negative) results from a clinical trial for one of Hypo’s new drugs on their earnings conference call at 10:30 AM ET, an hour after trading opens for Hypo shares.

Our HYPO investor incurs several risk-points in pursuing their biotech investment, such as:

  1. Overall stock market volatility (beta) that may drive changes in HYPO share price irrespective of any specific company phenomena,
  2. Aversion or affinity within the investment community for the Healthcare sector or Biotech subsector of which HYPO is a member,
  3. Analysts’ analysis and opinions on the probability that HYPO will miss, meet, or exceed their expectations for the company’s quarterly results and/or future performance, and
  4. Views within the HYPO investment community on the potential success, or lack thereof, of the company’s new drug.

Utilizing dollar-cost averaging to potentially manage through this litany of risks – the other side of which are opportunities – might involve our HYPO investor buying a one-quarter (250 shares) position prior to any company-specific events. For the sake of adding specificity to our example, let us assume HYPO shares trade for $10 each upon our investor initiating their position for an outlay of $2,500.

Subsequent to this initial purchase, one of HYPO’s sell-side analysts decides to downgrade HYPO shares from Buy to Neutral a day prior to the company announcing quarterly earnings. In response HYPO shares trade 10% lower to $9 per share. The investor picks up another 250 shares at this $9 figure, resulting in a weighted-average price of $9.50.

Exacerbating this downside momentum, a day later HYPO just meets expectations for its quarterly financial performance. Also, management chooses not to mention any new drug developments in its earnings press release: shares give up another 10% and trade to $8.10 after the markets open. Our investor – eyes on the long-term prizes they expect HYPO to offer – picks up another 250 shares at $8.10 per share, bringing their average cost to $9.275 per share.

An hour later in management’s commentary concerning future prospects for HYPO, they mention the positive clinical trial results that our investor thought might materialize on the call. Shares on this news shoot 10% higher than their $8.10 low to $8.91 per share. Our investor rounds out their 1,000-share position at this $8.91 per share price, bringing their weighted average price per HYPO share to just over $9.00 (see table below).

Hypothetical Investment in Hypothetical Biovations (HYPO)

  Shares Price Incremental Investment Total Position Average Cost
Initial Trade 250 $10.00 $2,500.00 $10.00
Trade #2 250 $9.00 $2,250.00 $9.50
Trade #3 250 $8.10 $2,025.00 $9.03
Trade #4 250 $8.91 $2,227.50 $9.00

We’ll provide a positive ending to our HYPO example. Sell-side analysts’ upside revisions that incorporate their more robust expectations for HYPO’s new drug cascade through the market. As a result HYPO’s share price moves through the $10 level, leaving our investor with a tidy $1,000 profit vis-à-vis their $9.00 dollar-cost average-driven average weighted price as well as the $10 figure at which they initiated their position

Of equal potential value for investors considering employing dollar-cost averaging in their efforts, the method works for exiting positions as well. To illustrate this simply replace the “buy” related verbs in the above paragraph with “sell” verbiage: the figures remain the same. While our example employs a relatively short time frame of several days, driven by a specific event, the principle defining the prospective value of dollar-cost averaging in to or out of tradeable assets typically works over a wide range of timeframes and market conditions.

Why Downward Moves in Equity Markets Feel So Painful

Adages, aphorisms, sayings, and such gain popularity because they so often prove to be correct. A handful of my favorites:

  • The market can remain irrational longer than you can remain liquid.
  • This time it’s different.
  • Bulls make money. Bears make money. Pigs get slaughtered.
  • The market is a discounting mechanism.

With this missive I’ll focus on the last maxim: the stock market as a discounting mechanism. Equity markets in 2022 increasingly discount an impending recession. The drivers of this phenomenon range from supply shortages and logistical challenges driving outsized inflation to war, pollical strife and gridlock. Regardless of which of these factors most influences asset prices, their cumulative impact on sentiment probably exacts the most meaningful effect. The fact that negative sentiment commences to outpace fundamental factors really should not surprise investors, but it does so…repeatedly.

The following graphic from Morningstar details the degree to which the precipitous equity market downturn of 2007 to 2009 (black box) substantially outpaced the fundamentals of the S&P 500 (green box) over that period of time. While S&P 500 fundamentals deteriorated 17% over this period, the total return for the Index declined 58%!

Recent research from Credit Suisse First Boston detailed a similar relationship between equity market activity to start 2022 and fundamentals (see following table). Whereas the median S&P 500 stock price dropped 24.4% since its peak level, S&P 500 earnings expectations increased 3.3%. The breadth of this expected earnings improvement remained broad as all eleven sectors posted improvements in their earnings prospects.

Obviously, the market discounts not earnings growth, but rather significant and painful earnings contraction. The massive money-making opportunity here exists in determining which discounting component is wrong: prices or earnings forecasts. My guess is that it will prove to be a little of both. As such, I prefer to err on the side of picking companies with more easily trackable earnings (Energy and Materials, for instance) and with large and established bases of operations (like Microsoft, ServiceNow, Cigna, and Humana).

It’s Not to Early to Start Thinking about a Midyear Financial Review

The Although temperatures in many parts of the US recently felt summer-like, several weeks of spring remain. Consumer price inflation and asset market volatilities probably make those temps feel even hotter. These phenomena may have resulted in relatively large changes in incomes, expenses, as well as the sources of these incomes and expenses. As such, for many of us the next few weeks before summer and, hopefully, vacations arrive, may prove fruitful for midyear financial plan reviews.

I recommend commencing a review by creating a checklist with timeline-delineated items:

  • Near-term
  • Medium-term
  • Long-term

Typically, breaking jobs down into smaller tasks aids in execution. Additionally, using a timeline, with the most important items near the top, offers a risk-based manner to address items just in case the process gets pushed to the back-burner by more pressing items.

Near-Term Financial Review Items:

Near-term items for review fall into three main categories: 1) Income, 2) Expense, and 3) Benefits. Checking income for most of us should be a relatively quick exercise involving cursory reviews of a recent paystub and the bank account into which your employer regularly deposits your earnings.  Providing those figures meet (or hopefully exceed) expectations, the review could progress on to evaluating expenses. If a budget exists, which I recommend, reconciliation of checking, savings, and investment account balances with mid-year expectations offers a potential roadmap for identifying “gaps” in the income-expense relationship. Potential next steps could involve evaluating credit card statements and/or bank account withdrawals for the sources of any gaps. While that paystub remains easily accessible, do a quick check-up on Flexible Savings and Health Savings Account balances, along with a review of tax withholding. This is a fine time to schedule any planned doctors’ or dentist’s visits yet to be booked as well.

A couple other items may be added to this Near-Term List as well. Given the prevalence of identity theft, a periodic credit report review is a financial review best practice. Thinking about charitable giving mid-year also may prove useful for you as well as for the recipients of your gifts.

Medium-Term Financial Review Items:

Quick glances at retirement, education, and emergency fund contributions and balances represent medium-term items for a productive financial review. Assure that deductions flow in the proper amounts to the proper accounts. Given the large moves thus far in 2022 for many assets classes, it likely will prove beneficial for many people to spend some time on their asset allocation plans. Reconcile that current account holdings compare well with target weightings by asset class and/or sector. A rule of thumb for emergency funds are that they cover three months of projected expenses: with inflation running hot maybe a little more needs to be held in reserve here. Finally, take looks at outstanding debt balances: mortgages, student loans, etc. to gauge payments made thus far in 2022 match with expected balances.

Long-Term Financial Review Items:

Confirmation that estate plans and wills reside where they are supposed to be come near the top of the Long-Term List. Similarly, assuring that safe deposit box keys, passwords, and similar items and information are where they are supposed to be remains a good idea. Reviewing beneficiary information for retirement and other financial accounts while documents are front-of-mind and accessible could save a great deal of time and frustration in the future.

“Tell Me More About Inflation,” Said No One

The Raise your hand if your sick and tired of hearing about inflation. Yeah, me too. I raised my hand and I’m sitting in a room, by myself.

So, I’ll go a step further and illustrate how Solyco Wealth attempted to “harden” its investors’ portfolios to endure the pernicious effects of inflation. A handful of other phenomena the same amount of people want to hear more about that want to listen to more commentary on inflation complicate the situation: rising interest rates, global political turmoil, supply chain snafus. My 13- and 14-year-old daughters can now recite intelligent memes on these topics as their so ubiquitous as to be on TikTok, whatever that is.

Let me first say that I largely avoided trading client portfolios through the deepest downturns of early March and late April 2022. I’ll take the “win,” but most portfolios entered 2022 with sizeable cash balances. With 8%+ inflation chewing away at probable future purchasing power, however, holding cash to avoid volatility seemed like admitting defeat to a self-proclaimed stock picker such as myself. Solution, I drew down cash and leaned into these downturns by investing a decent amount of these cash balances. In fact, for the Conservative Model Portfolio I reduced the target cash balance 500 basis points to 10% from 15%.

I retain allocations to fixed income ranging from 5% in my Aggressive Model Portfolio to 65% in that aforementioned Conservative Model Portfolio. However, I started out with a much shorter duration than that of the Bloomberg Aggregate Bond Index against which I benchmark my portfolios and I shortened that duration even further. Hopefully recognizing the value of a benign environment for company defaults and for adjustable-rate securities, I allocated 10% of the less-risky portfolios to publicly-traded, private capital providers Ares Capital (ARCC) and Hercules Capital (HTGC). As compared to the approximately 14.3% and 12.7% respective losses for the iShares 20+ Year (TLT) and 5-10 Year (IGIB) ETFs, ARCC and HTGC, respectively, offered returns of +5.9% and -3.2% while offering dividend yields multiples of those offered by those bond ETFs. Furthermore, I swapped out of TLT altogether in favor of more flex-rate debt with a the SPDR Blackstone Senior Loan ETF (SRLN). I anticipate the trade-off for the expected better price performances and higher yields from ARCC, HTGC, and SRLN, among the other credit-driven investments in the portfolios, being an intensified necessity of monitoring default probabilities.

With respect to picking stocks to counter the impacts of inflation, the overweight to Energy with which we initiated Solyco Wealth’s model portfolios compensated investors well for the risks incurred. Unfortunately, the Ukraine-Russia war elevated these gains, but to the detriments for much of the balance of the portfolios. I also augmented these Energy-related gains by selling covered calls in the options market in order to manage and benefit from higher volatilities. As the outlook for employment remains robust and healthcare facilities re-opened with diminishing COVID cases, Solyco Wealth overweighted Healthcare. While that sector enjoys some pricing power, facilities operators, like Universal Health Services (UHS), which is an Aggressive Model Portfolio holding, got severely clipped by significantly higher contract labor costs: win some, lose some. Finally, we also recently moved to an overweight on Industrials, anticipating that certain subsectors like defense, energy equipment, and automation, would offer outperformance opportunities. While near-term performances largely fell in-line with those of the broader equity market, order rates for companies like ABB and Chart Industries (GTLS) achieved record levels. We remain underweight Consumer Staples, anticipating that raw materials costs will inordinately pressure margins. Names like Archer Daniels (ADM), Bunge (BG), and Kroger (KR) certainly offer appeal, though. Despite their run-up to start 2022, we also continue to avoid Utilities, which generally underperform in rising rate environments as a function of minimal pricing power and diminished relative attractiveness of their dividends. I retained our Tech holdings, which basically round-tripped their late 2021 gains with 2022 declines, as the generally were among the high-margin, high-earning components of the sector. Notably, Amazon (AMZ) and Shopify (SHOP), which sit on the cusp of the Technology and Consumer Discretionary sectors, certainly left marks from their price declines.

A Yesteryear Name Focusing on Tomorrow: Old-School Tech

The 2022 wreck in Tech stocks, which declined ~19.8% as measured by the price change in Vanguard’s IT Index Fund (VGT), took a short reprieve yesterday (4/25/22). More share price pummeling commenced today (4/26/22), however, as one can see in the Yahoo! Finance chart below.

Much of this Tech stock price downdraft came amidst generally robust earnings and cash flow. In fact, the number of 4- and 5-star rated Tech stocks in Morningstar’s coverage universe, as reflected in the graph to the right, more than quadrupled from less than 20 for 1Q21 to almost 70 mid-week last week. Notably, that was before the acceleration of the price rout Friday, 4/22/22, and earlier this morning! Not known for being aggressive with its ratings and future estimates, such an increase in Morningstar’s highly rated Tech stocks obviously grabbed attention.

As I reviewed early 1Q22 earnings performances on Tech stock in particular also warranted interest: Corning (GLW). We neither advocate for buying to selling GLW shares, although we include them in our Conservative and Moderate Model Portfolios. Rather, we thought investors might be interested in a number of things about GLW. First, many may be surprised that the old-school glassmaker counts as a Tech stock. For 170 years, though, Corning’s been at the forefront of materials and glass technology counting cathode ray tubes for televisions, Gorilla Glass for iPhones, and fiber optics, among its inventions and improvements. Folks that buy and sell stocks irrespective of their industry classifications don’t care how S&P or whoever else categorizes companies by sector but doing so proves crucial in building and maintaining diversified portfolios.

Second, by virtue of its creative applications of materials and glass technologies GLW built a very diverse set of end markets that not only benefits its financial performance and its investors, but also that yields solid observations on the state of these end markets. These observations, in our experience, often prove valuable for insights and conclusions for investments in Tech and other sectors. In its latest release of financial and operating results for 1Q22, for instance, GLW noted a 28% year-over-year increase in Optical Communications revenue. No guarantees here, but this significant increase could bode well for Telecom Equipment providers (Cisco, Arista Networks), cell-tower companies (American Tower, Crown-Castle SBA Communications), and/or enterprise cloud service providers (Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet). Display Technologies also posted a double-digit, 11%, increase in sales for 1Q22 vs. 1Q21 with management specifically calling out positive exposure to Samsung’s Galaxy S22 Series smartphone. Maybe this indicates a little market share erosion for Apple: no way to tell for certain but it bears watching. Another interesting point on the diversity of GLW’s product portfolio that contributed to upside business results: Corning’s Life Sciences segment produced the vials from which 5.5 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines were delivered.

Now, at this point, a discriminating investor might ask: “As the world hopefully won’t need 5.5 billion doses of any vaccines in the near future, won’t declines in this business hurt GLW’s future performance?” In response we anticipate that GLW’s management would reply that it expects the company’s Automotive segment, which saw revenue drop 9% from 1Q21 due to semiconductor availability and supply-chain issues, to more than make up for any loss in its Life Sciences segment. Just our guess, though. Anyway, here’s a breakdown of GLW’s 1Q22 sales by segment with prior period comparisons.